A task-based connectome study

This article was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Open Access Publication Fund of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.The functional connectome is organized into several separable intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs) that are thought to be the building blocks of the mind. However, it is currently not well understood how these networks are engaged by emotionally salient information, and how such engagement fits into emotion theories. The current study assessed how ICNs respond during the processing of angry and fearful faces in a large sample (N = 843) and examined how connectivity changes relate to the ICNs. All ICNs were modulated by emotional faces and showed functional interactions, a finding which is in line with the “theory of constructed emotions” that assumes that basic emotion do not arise from separable ICNs but from their interplay. We further identified a set of brain regions whose connectivity changes during the tasks suggest a special role as “affective hubs” in the brain. While hubs were located in all ICNs, we observed high selectivity for the amygdala within the subcortical network, a finding which also fits into “primary emotion” theory. The topology of hubs corresponded closely to a set of brain regions that has been implicated in anxiety disorders, pointing towards a clinical relevance of the present findings. The present data are the most comprehensive mapping of connectome-wide changes in functionally connectivity evoked by an affective processing task thus far and support two competing views on how emotions are represented in the brain, suggesting that the connectome paradigm might help with unifying the two ideas.Peer Reviewe

Attention networks and the intrinsic network structure of the human brain

Attention network theory distinguishes three independent systems, each supported by its own distributed network: an alerting network to deploy attentional resources in anticipation, an orienting network to direct attention to a cued location, and a control network to select relevant information at the expense of concurrently available information. Ample behavioral and neuroimaging evidence supports the dissociation of the three attention domains. The strong assumption that each attentional system is realized through a separable network, however, raises the question how these networks relate to the intrinsic network structure of the brain. Our understanding of brain networks has advanced majorly in the past years due to the increasing focus on brain connectivity. The brain is intrinsically organized into several large-scale networks whose modular structure persists across task states. Existing proposals on how the presumed attention networks relate to intrinsic networks rely mostly on anecdotal and partly contradictory arguments. We addressed this issue by mapping different attention networks at the level of cifti-grayordinates. Resulting group maps were compared to the group-level topology of 23 intrinsic networks, which we reconstructed from the same participants' resting state fMRI data. We found that all attention domains recruited multiple and partly overlapping intrinsic networks and converged in the dorsal fronto-parietal and midcingulo-insular network. While we observed a preference of each attentional domain for its own set of intrinsic networks, implicated networks did not match well to those proposed in the literature. Our results indicate a necessary refinement of the attention network theory.Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001659We acknowledge support by the Open Access Publication Fund of Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin.Peer Reviewe

The Big Five Personality Traits and Brain Arousal in the Resting State

Based on Eysenck’s biopsychological trait theory, brain arousal has long been considered to explain individual differences in human personality. Yet, results from empirical studies remained inconclusive. However, most published results have been derived from small samples and, despite inherent limitations, EEG alpha power has usually served as an exclusive indicator for brain arousal. To overcome these problems, we here selected N = 468 individuals of the LIFE-Adult cohort and investigated the associations between the Big Five personality traits and brain arousal by using the validated EEG- and EOG-based analysis tool VIGALL. Our analyses revealed that participants who reported higher levels of extraversion and openness to experience, respectively, exhibited lower levels of brain arousal in the resting state. Bayesian and frequentist analysis results were especially convincing for openness to experience. Among the lower-order personality traits, we obtained the strongest evidence for neuroticism facet ‘impulsivity’ and reduced brain arousal. In line with this, both impulsivity and openness have previously been conceptualized as aspects of extraversion. We regard our findings as well in line with the postulations of Eysenck and consistent with the recently proposed ‘arousal regulation model’. Our results also agree with meta-analytically derived effect sizes in the field of individual differences research, highlighting the need for large (collaborative) studies.Peer Reviewe

Computational mechanisms of belief updating in relation to psychotic-like experiences

Introduction Psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) may occur due to changes in weighting prior beliefs and new evidence in the belief updating process. It is still unclear whether the acquisition or integration of stable beliefs is altered, and whether such alteration depends on the level of environmental and belief precision, which reflects the associated uncertainty. This motivated us to investigate uncertainty-related dynamics of belief updating in relation to PLEs using an online study design. Methods We selected a sample (n = 300) of participants who performed a belief updating task with sudden change points and provided self-report questionnaires for PLEs. The task required participants to observe bags dropping from a hidden helicopter, infer its position, and dynamically update their belief about the helicopter's position. Participants could optimize performance by adjusting learning rates according to inferred belief uncertainty (inverse prior precision) and the probability of environmental change points. We used a normative learning model to examine the relationship between adherence to specific model parameters and PLEs. Results PLEs were linked to lower accuracy in tracking the outcome (helicopter location) (β = 0.26 ± 0.11, p = 0.018) and to a smaller increase of belief precision across observations after a change point (β = −0.003 ± 0.0007, p < 0.001). PLEs were related to slower belief updating when participants encountered large prediction errors (β = −0.03 ± 0.009, p = 0.001). Computational modeling suggested that PLEs were associated with reduced overall belief updating in response to prediction errors (βPE = −1.00 ± 0.45, p = 0.028) and reduced modulation of updating at inferred environmental change points (βCPP = −0.84 ± 0.38, p = 0.023). Discussion We conclude that PLEs are associated with altered dynamics of belief updating. These findings support the idea that the process of balancing prior belief and new evidence, as a function of environmental uncertainty, is altered in PLEs, which may contribute to the development of delusions. Specifically, slower learning after large prediction errors in people with high PLEs may result in rigid beliefs. Disregarding environmental change points may limit the flexibility to establish new beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. The present study fosters a deeper understanding of inferential belief updating mechanisms underlying PLEs.Peer Reviewe

Computational mechanisms of belief updating in relation to psychotic-like experiences

Introduction: Psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) may occur due to changes in weighting prior beliefs and new evidence in the belief updating process. It is still unclear whether the acquisition or integration of stable beliefs is altered, and whether such alteration depends on the level of environmental and belief precision, which reflects the associated uncertainty. This motivated us to investigate uncertainty-related dynamics of belief updating in relation to PLEs using an online study design. Methods: We selected a sample (n = 300) of participants who performed a belief updating task with sudden change points and provided self-report questionnaires for PLEs. The task required participants to observe bags dropping from a hidden helicopter, infer its position, and dynamically update their belief about the helicopter's position. Participants could optimize performance by adjusting learning rates according to inferred belief uncertainty (inverse prior precision) and the probability of environmental change points. We used a normative learning model to examine the relationship between adherence to specific model parameters and PLEs. Results: PLEs were linked to lower accuracy in tracking the outcome (helicopter location) (beta = 0.26 +/- 0.11, p = 0.018) and to a smaller increase of belief precision across observations after a change point (beta = -0.003 +/- 0.0007, p < 0.001). PLEs were related to slower belief updating when participants encountered large prediction errors (beta = -0.03 +/- 0.009, p = 0.001). Computational modeling suggested that PLEs were associated with reduced overall belief updating in response to prediction errors (beta(PE) = -1.00 +/- 0.45, p = 0.028) and reduced modulation of updating at inferred environmental change points (beta(CPP) = -0.84 +/- 0.38, p = 0.023). Discussion: We conclude that PLEs are associated with altered dynamics of belief updating. These findings support the idea that the process of balancing prior belief and new evidence, as a function of environmental uncertainty, is altered in PLEs, which may contribute to the development of delusions. Specifically, slower learning after large prediction errors in people with high PLEs may result in rigid beliefs. Disregarding environmental change points may limit the flexibility to establish new beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. The present study fosters a deeper understanding of inferential belief updating mechanisms underlying PLEs

Linking Brain Age Gap to Mental and Physical Health in the Berlin Aging Study II

From a biological perspective, humans differ in the speed they age, and this may manifest in both mental and physical health disparities. The discrepancy between an individual’s biological and chronological age of the brain (“brain age gap”) can be assessed by applying machine learning techniques to Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) data. Here, we examined the links between brain age gap and a broad range of cognitive, affective, socioeconomic, lifestyle, and physical health variables in up to 335 adults of the Berlin Aging Study II. Brain age gap was assessed using a validated prediction model that we previously trained on MRI scans of 32,634 UK Biobank individuals. Our statistical analyses revealed overall stronger evidence for a link between higher brain age gap and less favorable health characteristics than expected under the null hypothesis of no effect, with 80% of the tested associations showing hypothesis-consistent effect directions and 23% reaching nominal significance. The most compelling support was observed for a cluster covering both cognitive performance variables (episodic memory, working memory, fluid intelligence, digit symbol substitution test) and socioeconomic variables (years of education and household income). Furthermore, we observed higher brain age gap to be associated with heavy episodic drinking, higher blood pressure, and higher blood glucose. In sum, our results point toward multifaceted links between brain age gap and human health. Understanding differences in biological brain aging may therefore have broad implications for future informed interventions to preserve mental and physical health in old age

Enhancing precision in human neuroscience

Human neuroscience has always been pushing the boundary of what is measurable. During the last decade, concerns about statistical power and replicability – in science in general, but also specifically in human neuroscience – have fueled an extensive debate. One important insight from this discourse is the need for larger samples, which naturally increases statistical power. An alternative is to increase the precision of measurements, which is the focus of this review. This option is often overlooked, even though statistical power benefits from increasing precision as much as from increasing sample size. Nonetheless, precision has always been at the heart of good scientific practice in human neuroscience, with researchers relying on lab traditions or rules of thumb to ensure sufficient precision for their studies. In this review, we encourage a more systematic approach to precision. We start by introducing measurement precision and its importance for well-powered studies in human neuroscience. Then, determinants for precision in a range of neuroscientific methods (MRI, M/EEG, EDA, Eye-Tracking, and Endocrinology) are elaborated. We end by discussing how a more systematic evaluation of precision and the application of respective insights can lead to an increase in reproducibility in human neuroscience

A new measure for the revised reinforcement sensitivity theory: Psychometric criteria and genetic validation

Jeffrey Gray's Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) represents one of the most influential biologically-based personality theories describing individual differences in approach and avoidance tendencies. The most prominent self-report inventory to measure individual differences in approach and avoidance behavior to date is the BIS/BAS scale by Carver and White (1994). As Gray and McNaughton (2000) revised the RST after its initial formulation in the 1970/80s, and given the Carver and White measure is based on the initial conceptualization of RST, there is a growing need for self-report inventories measuring individual differences in the revised behavioral inhibition system (BIS), behavioral activation system (BAS) and the fight, flight, freezing system (FFFS). Therefore, in this paper we present a new questionnaire measuring individual differences in the revised constructs of the BIS, BAS and FFFS in N = 1814 participants (German sample). An English translated version of the new measure is also presented and tested in N = 299 English language participants. A large number of German participants (N = 1090) also filled in the BIS/BAS scales by Carver and White (1994) and the correlations between these measures are presented. Finally, this same subgroup of participants provided buccal swaps for the investigation of the arginine vasopressin receptor 1a (AVPR1a) gene. Here, a functional genetic polymorphism (rs11174811) on the AVPR1a gene was shown to be associated with individual differences in both the revised BIS and classic BIS dimensions

10Kin1day: A Bottom-Up Neuroimaging Initiative.

We organized 10Kin1day, a pop-up scientific event with the goal to bring together neuroimaging groups from around the world to jointly analyze 10,000+ existing MRI connectivity datasets during a 3-day workshop. In this report, we describe the motivation and principles of 10Kin1day, together with a public release of 8,000+ MRI connectome maps of the human brain